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SECTION 13(d) DISCLOSURE: GUIDELINES
FOR GROUP THERAPISTS
BENJAMIN M. VANDEGRIFT *
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1968, the cash tender offer' represented the last un-
civilized frontier on the corporate takeover landscape. Unlike ex-
change offers, which involved a distribution or public offering of
securities and were thus subject to the registration and prospectus
delivery requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 2 cash tender
offers had been treated simply as large scale market purchases. Not
even the name of the buyer was required to be disclosed. Much of
the concern over the non-regulation of the cash tender offer was
dispelled by the passage of the Williams Act 3 in 1968. The Williams
* A, B., Dickinson College, 1962; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1968; Assis-
tant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, School of Law. The author wishes to
express his appreciation for the assistance of James W. Turner in the preparation of this
article.
The term "tender offer" ordinarily is associated with that technique of corporate
takeover which is accomplished by the publication of "tombstone" type advertisements in the
larger metropolitan daily newspapers. The advertisements offer present shareholders of the
target corporation an opportunity to exchange their shares for either cash or securities, or a
combination of the two. In contractual terms, it is the shareholder who is actually the offeror.
The party seeking to acquire control of the issuer is simply requesting the shareholder to offer
his shares. To distinguish between those "tender offers" involving straight cash consideration
and those involving securities, the terms "cash tender offer" and "exchange offer" have been
coined, See Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U.
Pa. L. Rev, 853 n.2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as U. Pa. Comment]. In recent years the term has
been broadened to include some rather unusual transactions within its scope. See generally
Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250 (1973). But see D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, [ — Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 94,771, at 96562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Nachman Corp. v.
Halfred, Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 94,455, at 95590-93 (N.D.
Ill. 1973).
The subject of cash and exchange tender offers has generated a substantial amount of
literature both prior and subsequent to the 1968 pasage of regulatory legislation, discussed in
text accompanying notes 3-22 infra. See sources cited in: U. Pa. Comment, supra, at 853 n.2;
R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation—Cases and Materials 940, 952, 964 (3d ed.
1972). For more recent comment on this subject, see generally E. Aranow & H. Einhorn,
Tender Offers for Corporate Control (1973); V. Brudney & M. Chirclstein, Cases & Materials
on Corporate Finance 657-715 (1972); Robinson & Mahoney, Schedule 130: Wild Card in the
Takeover Deck, 27 Bus. Law. 1107 (1972); Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law
90-439—Growing Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How.
L,J, 654 (1971).
2
 15 U.S.C. §5 77a-77aa (1970).
Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 5* 12-14, 15 U.S.C. 55 781, 78m-78n (1970). The Securities and Exchange
Commission has announced plans to conduct a broad investigation into the takeover and
acquisition field, with particular emphasis on the Williams Act's amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1970). SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
11003, reprinted in [1974 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,956, at 84460-65 (Div.
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Act closed this gap4
 in the scheme of federal securities regulations by
requiring detailed disclosure by the soliciting party simultaneous
with the publication of the request for tenders. Congress recognized,
however, that a disclosure requirement triggered only by the actual
announcement or extension of a cash tender offer would be
incomplete. 5
 Hence, the 1968 legislation also added sections 13(d)
and (e) 6
 to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act)7 which,
acting as a legal backstop to sections 14(d) and (e) of the Act, 8 in
certain cases require disclosure of substantial acquisitions of an
issuer's equity securities to the management of the issuer as well as
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commis-
sion) within ten days of such acquisitions.
MoSt of the focus during the debate over the Williams Act was
Corp. Fin., Sept. 9, 1974); Wall Street Journal, Sept. 10, 1974, at 3, col. 2. One of the specific
questions the Commission poses in the release is "[w]hether the Commission should define the
term 'group' or otherwise adopt rules for the purpose of [§1 13(d)(3) ... to provide greater
certainty with respect to the commencement and termination of a group's reporting require-
ments." 11974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,956, at 84463.
4
 There continues to exist a body of opinion that no "gap" ever existed in the regulation
of the cash tender offer. See, e.g., Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares—A Reply to
Chairman Cohen, 1967 Duke L. J. 231. One argument in support of the theory that a gap
existed was to the effect that a tender offer was directly analogous to a solicitation of proxies
under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S,C. § 78n(a) (1970) and Reg. 14A,
17 C.F.R. § 240, 14a (1973), promulgated thereunder. This argument was refuted forcefully by
Professor Robert H. Mundheim's testimony at the hearings on S. 510, the bill which eventu-
ally became the Williams Act:
[A proxy contest is] a really different matter than a tender offer. In a proxy contest,
both parties are asking for the right to manage somebody else's money. In that kind
of situation I think that the person who is being asked to give up his right to manage
his money is entitled to a certain amount of information.
In a cash tender offer the man to whom the tender offer is made is asked to
terminate his relationship with the company. This seems a wholly different matter.
I think in many ways the much more accurate analogy for the cash tender offer
is a normal market transaction.
Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1967). Despite this cogent analysis, it is difficult to
understand the rationale behind objections to fuller disclosure in the cash tender offer area.
5
 Purchasers seeking to acquire control could and did move quietly into the market and
purchase enough shares to assure victory in a subsequent request for tenders. 111 Cong. Rec.
28258 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams). A thorough examination of the legislative history
and purpose of the Williams Act is contained in U. Pa. Comment, supra note 1, at 859-66.
Relying on Senator Williams' remark's during the congressional debate on S. 2731, the
unenacted predecessor to S. 510, the bill which eventually became the Williams Act, that
comment took the position that any aggregation of the statutory percentage of a class of the
issuer's equity securities, see § 13(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.0 §
78m(d)(1) (1970), quoted in text at note 13 infra, triggers the section's filing requirements so
long as there exists the potential for change in the control pattern of a corporation. U. Pa.
Comment, supra note 1, at 862-63, 876. Although that author may be correct.in  arguing that
if an aggregtion has occurred, filing should follow, this article is adressed to the question of
when the aggregation occurs.
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e) (1970).
7
 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act].
15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d), (e) (1970).
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on the sections dealing with cash tender offers. It is, however,
section 13(d), the backstop, which has proven most troublesome. In
particular, section 13(d)(3), 9 which compels a "group" of persons to
file the detailed information required by section 13(d)(1)'° when they
"acquire" more than a threshold percentage" of any class of the
issuer's securities, has caused the failure of many a planned corpo-
rate acquisition. The courts have imposed stringent sanctions on
groups which failed to file or which filed inadequately. This article
will focus on the case of a complete failure to file. It is 'hoped that
the article will demonstrate that, while the SEC and the courts hold
somewhat differing viewpoints on what constitutes a "group" under
section 13(d)(3), the securities law practitioner has available com-
prehensible guidelines from which to formulate his counsel.
II. SECTION 13(d) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Although the legislative history of section 13(d) is somewhat
scant," the section appears, to have been designed to mandate
disclosure of every rapidly acquired block of securities. Its basic
directive is that:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly
the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class
which is registered pursuant to [section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934] . . . is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class
shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to the
issuer of the security at its principal executive office, by
4 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1970),
I° 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970).
II The term "threshold percentage" is used throughout this article to refer to five percent
of any class of the issuer's equity securities. See § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(1) (1970),
quoted in text at note 13 infra,
12 SEC Chairman Cohen argued that § 13(d) was a necessary addition to the insider
disclosure provisions of § 16 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970). See Hearings on S.
510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Commerce,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1967) (remarks of Securities & Exchange Commission Chairman
Manuel F. Cohen). Several other witnesses argued the redundancy of § 13(d) to § 16.
Hearings, supra at 128-29 (remarks of Arthur Fleischer, Jr.); id. at 246-47 (letter from Milton
H. Cohen to Senator Williams). Little else in the way of justification or rationale for § 13(d)'s
disclosure provisions appears in any of the other legislative materials. See generally Hearings
on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm, on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. Rep. No. 550,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The bill was
enacted without significant debate on July 29, 1968, and signed into law by President Johnson
the same day.
Section 13(d) has been discussed at length in a number of articles which have appeared
since its passage in 1968. In addition to U. Pa. Comment, supra note 1, see generally Griffin
& Tucker, supra note 1, at 664-93; Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970
Amendments, 26 Bus. Law. 1637-41 (1971).
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registered or certified mail, send to each exchange where
the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a
statement containing such of the following information,
and such additional information, as the Commission may
by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors . . . . 13
The statute requires the "person" who acquires a five percent in-
terest to disclose, inter alia: the identities and background of all
persons by whom or on whose behalf the purchases have been
effected;" the source and amount of the funds used or to be used in
making the purchases;" whether the purchaser intends to merge,
" Exchange Act § 13(dXI), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970). As originally enacted § 13(d)
required filing only after ten percent of a class of any equity security had been "acquired." In
1970 the threshold percentage was lowered to five percent because of evidence that ac-
quisitors were purchasing up to, but slightly less than, the ten percent "triggering"
percentage and then seeking to gain control of the issuer, usually through a cash or exchange
tender offer. Act of December 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1(a)(2), amending Exchange
Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970).
When the threshold percentage was reduced, objection was made by stock exchange
specialists, underwriters, over-the-counter market-makers, and investment companies. They
complained that the lower level would compel filing of Schedule 13D statements in instances
where purchases were not meant to influence control. See Hearings on S. 336 and S. 3431
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 108, 115-17 (1970); Hearings on H.R. 4285, S. 3431 and S. 336 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm, on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-75, at 58-59, 68-69 (1970). The congressional
response was Exchange Act § 13(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(5) (1970), which permits the filing
of a short notice instead of the more detailed Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1974).
The short notice requires the purchaser's name, size of holdings, acquisition date, and such
other information as the SEC may require. It can be used only when the acquisition was in
the ordinary course of business. The Commission has not yet developed a short form Schedule
13D. It is still unclear "whether a broker-dealer managing discretionary accounts which own
in the aggregate more than 5 percent of the issuer's equity securities must file a Schedule 13D
statement." E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 93 n.74.
14
 Exchange Act § 13(d)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A) (1970). This subparagraph also
requires disclosure if the purchases "are to be effected." Id. (emphasis added). It is difficult to
understand precisely what this clause means since § 13(d) merely requires that disclosure be
made subsequent to acquisition. Even assuming some rather unusual interpretations of the
word "acquisition," no one has yet suggested that § 13(d) requires pre-acquisition disclosure.
It has been pointed out that, as originally proposed, S. 510 would have required that the
statement by a tender offeror be filed with the Commission five days in advance of the making
of the offer. Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection with Cash Take-Over Bids, 24 Bus.
Law. 19, 24 n,12 (1968). The requirement was deleted, as a result of opposition of the New
York Stock Exchange, which feared that such a pre-offer filing would be inconsistent with
NYSE public announcement requirements. Id. Schmults and Kelly attribute the use of certain
future tense language in the instructions to Schedule 13D to the fact that Schedule 13D is also
designed to cover the disclosure required by § 14(d) when a full-fledged tender offer is
involved. Id. at 22.
15
 Exchange Act § 13(d)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(B) (1970). This subparagraph also
requires a description of any transaction in which funds were borrowed for the purpose of
acquiring securities of the issuer. Such disclosure can be crucial to the success or failure of a
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liquidate or "make any other major change" in the business or
corporate structure of the issuer;" the number of shares of "such
security" beneficially owned by the purchaser as well as the number
of shares which the purchaser has a right to acquire; 17 and, finally,
information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings
involving the securities of the issuer."
Section 13(d)(1) also contains the usual grant of authority to the
Commission to prescribe, through administrative rulemaking, dis-
closure of such additional information as it deems necessary to carry
out the statutory purpose. Pursuant to this authority, the Commis-
sion has developed Schedule 13D 19 which is the form which must be
filed to fulfill the requirements of section 13(d)(1). Under section
13(d) and Rule 13d-1, 2° the information required by Schedule 13D
cash tender offer. Cf, Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids—Defense Tactics, 23 Bus,
Law. 115, 122 (1967). The names of the parties to any loan transaction must be included in
the description of the transaction. However, "where a source of funds is a loan made in the
ordinary course of business by a bank," the name of the bank will not be made avail-
able to the public if the person filing so requests. Exchange Act § 13(d)(I)(B), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m{d){1)(B) (1970).
16 Exchange Act § 13(d)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(1)(C) (1970). Because so much of the
discussion involving § 13(d) focuses on the possibility that control of a corporation may change
from one group to another, the term "control pattern" has been chosen to indicate the present
state of voting ownership in the issuer, It is difficult to state with precision exactly what is
meant by change in corporate structure or alteration of an issuer's control pattern. For
purposes of this article, it is assumed that the latter subsumes the former but that the two are
not synonymous. In many ways, the need for disclosure in these areas resembles the ever
present question of what constitutes a material fact. The question thus becomes: would a
reasonable investor need, or at least desire, to know that, because of an acquisition involving
a substantial amount of the corporation's equity, there exists a possibility that the issuer's
control pattern will be altered? Cf. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp,,
409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
Little authority exists an what is meant by "any other major change in its business or
corporate structure." Obviously a change in the chief executive officer or the forcing of
resignations from the board of directors so as to shift control would qualify. But what about a
decision to request one or possibly two seats on a twelve- or fifteen-man board? Obviously,
such information would have to be disclosed once a proxy solicitation began. See SEC Rule
14a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1974). The issue here, however, is whether such a decision
triggers an obligation to file under § 13(d) on the ground that it is the element that causes
group formation.
17 Exchange Act § 13(d)(1)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(D) (1970). Presumably, the words
"such security" in the section limit the required disclosure to that class of the issuer's securities
of which more than live percent are held by the person required to file. In other words, if a
person holds six percent of an issuer's common but only four percent of its preferred, the
Schedule 13D would disclose only the holdings in the common. Item 5 of Schedule 13D, 17
§ 240.13d-101 (1974), accords with this interpretation.
18 Exchange Act § 13(d)(1)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(E) (1970)..
14
 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1974). The Commission has also developed a series of rules
dealing with filings under § 13(d). Rulei 13d-1 to 13d-4, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d- l to -4 (1974).
An excellent analysis of these regulations and those promulgated by the Commission under
§§ 14(d)-(e) is contained in Schmults & Kelly, supra note 14.
2U
 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1974).
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must be filed whenever a person has accomplished the triggering
acquisition, i.e., an acquisition which causes him to own in excess
of five percent of any class of an issuer's equity securities. 2 '
However, more important to the present discussion is the pres-
ence of section 13(d)(3), which states that:
When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited
partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer,
such syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person" for the
purposes of [section 13(d)]. 22
It was the emphasized words which became, in the several years
subsequent to the statute's enactment, the bite noire of those
shareholders of an issuer who were collectively concerned about
management's performance. To their surprise, many of them would
be deemed members of section 13(d)(3) "groups" despite the fact that
no one member had made any purchases pursuant to an attempted
takeover, proxy fight, or other control-altering scheme. The
methods and analyses that the courts and the staff of the SEC have
used in reaching such conclusions are the focus of the remainder of
this article.
III. EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF "GROUP FORMATION"
Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot 23 was the first decision to consider
the intertwined issues of what constitutes a section 13(d) group and,
assuming the existence of the group, when section 13(d) requires
that group to file. For several months prior to September 1969,
Emmet Blot, a New York financier and member of the board of
Bath Industries, Inc., had been attempting to gain support among
the other directors for a move to oust the chief executive officer of
Bath. When his advances were spurned by the Bath management,
Blot turned to several other major stockholders in an attempt to
wrest control.The district court found as a fact that sometime before
mid-summer 1969, Blot and his confederates, including an English
merchant bank and its American subsidiary, had "pooled" their
voting shares in Bath with a view to acquiring more Bath shares
al An interesting empirical study could be made of the number of tender offers not
undertaken as a direct result of the legislation's effect of internalizing various costs of
disclosure. If the Senate Committee had had the benefit of some recently developed economic
wisdom, it is possible that the thrust of this legislation would have been markedly different.
See generally Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities (H. Manne, ed.
1969); J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, The Stock Market; Theories and Evidence (1973).
22
 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
23
 305 F. Supp. 526 (F.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
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and ultimately obtaining control of the corporation. 24 At no time did
Blot or any one of his supporters own as much as ten percent25 of
any class of Bath's securities. Collectively, however, they owned
close to fifty percent. 26
The district court held that since the actions of the defendants
had caused them to become a "group" formed for the purpose of
holding and acquiring the Bath stock, they violated section 13(d) by
failing to file within ten.days of formation. 27 Because of its further
finding that the group contemplated a vigorously contested proxy
fight which would, in the court's word, "chill" Bath's chances for
obtaining a lucrative ship building contract, the court enjoined all of
the defendants from proceeding with their plan to oust the incum-
bent Bath management "until it is determined that the 13(d) state-
ments that have been or will be filed by the defendants are legally
sufficient." 28 The defendants appealed the grant of the preliminary
injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
In May 1970 the Seventh Circuit handed down the first major
explication of the Williams Act "group" problem. 29 The legislative
history of the Williams Act was found to demonstrate a congres-
sional purpose to "protect the individual investor when substantial
shareholders or management undertake to acquire shares in a corpo-
ration for the purpose of solidifying their own position in a contest
over how or by whom the corporation should be managed." 3 ° The
Seventh Circuit consequently decided that Blot and his supporters
had formed a statutory group and had failed to file within the
prescribed time. 3 ' Attempting to steer its way between the Scylla of
non-disclosure of pre-Williams Act days and the Charybdis of "tip-
ping the scales in favor of . . management," 32 the court held that
24 305 F. Supp. at 531.
25 'The entire transaction took place prior to December 22, 1970, the date on which the
amendment lowered the threshold percentage from ten to five percent. See Pub. L. No.
91-567, § 1(a)(2) (1970), amending Exchange Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970).
26 305 F. Supp. at 532.
2/ Id. at 538.
29 Id. at 539. Immediately after commencement of the Bath action against them, several
of the defendants had filed Schedule 13D's. At the hearing on the preliminary injunction,
plaintiff urged the legal insufficiency of these filings. Obviously, the court's acceptance of
plaintiff's position augured heavily in the choice of remedy. The court could have enjoined the
Blot group's plan until the remaining members filed, at which time the control contest would
have ensued. By yielding to plaintiffs urging that the existing filings were false and mislead-
ing, id., the court changed the nature of the case from one dealing with timing to one dealing
with adequacy.
29 427 F.2d 97 (7th sir. 1970) (Hastings, J.).
30 Id. at 109, citing 113 Cong. Rec. 24664 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams),
31 427 F.2d at 111.
32 Id. at 109, quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 24664 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
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compliance with the Act's disclosure requirements was necessary
when, but only when, a group of stockholders, who among them-
selves own ten percent or more of the outstanding shares of any
class of an issuer's securities, agree to act in concert to acquire
additional shares. 33
 The Seventh Circuit also held that once the
plaintiff has shown that a group agreed to. pursue a common objec-
tive and that thereafter any member of the group purchased shares
of the issuer's stock, a rebuttable presumption arises that such
purchase was made pursuant to an agreement to acquire additional
shares entered into as of the date of the purchase. 34 Compliance
with the Act's disclosure provisions would be required within ten
days of such purchase. 35
The court of appeals never attempted to define the term "ac-
quisition" as it appears in section 13(d)(1). 36 Its decision that the
trial court was not clearly in error in finding that an agreement to
purchase additional shares had been reached sometime during the
summer of 1969, followed by several purchases of Bath securities by
members of the group, obviated further consideration of the ques-
tion of the acquisition. More important for present purposes, how-
ever, was the court's failure to elucidate which of the facts, stated in
the opinion in some detail, caused it to conclude that a statutory
group had indeed been formed. The opinion does allude to the
plaintiffs problem of proving an agreement, but limits the problem
to that of proving an agreement to purchase further shares after a
group has been formed. 37 Furthermore, the court's language—"once
the group agrees to act in concert to acquire shares" 38—indicates
that the Seventh Circuit believed that it was not the agreement itself
B 427 F.2d at 109. The court cited the following provisions from the House Report's
section-by-section analysis of the bill as support for the proposition that an actual purchase
was not necessary before a "group" could be held to have violated § 13(d):
[Section 13(d)(3)] would prevent a group of persons who seek to pool their voting or
other interests in the securities of an issuer from evading the provisions of the statute
because no one individual owns more than 10 percent of the securities. The group
would be deemed to have become the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of
more than 10 percent of a class of securities at the time they agreed to act in concert.
Consequently, the group would be required to file the information called for in
section 13(d)(1) within 10 days after they agree to act together, whether or not any
member of the group had acquired any securities at that time. This provision is
designed to obtain full disclosure of the identity of any person or group obtaining the
benefits of ownership of securities by reason of any contract, understanding, rela-
tionship, agreement or other arrangement.
H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2811, 2818, cited at 427 F.2d at 110.
34
 427 F.2d at 110.
3s
 Id. The practical effect of the rebuttable presumption was to require filing only after
the later purchase of purchases occurred. See U. Pa. Comment, supra note 1, at 871.
36
 See 427 F.2d at 110.
" Id.
38 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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that caused group formation. Apparently, the court's acceptance of
the subsequent purchases criterion caused it to conclude' that a strict
analysis of statutory group formation was not necessary in the
factual context.
About a year and a half after the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Bath Industries, the Second Circuit addressed the issues of group
formation and disclosure-timing under section 13(d) in GAF Corp. v.
Milstein, 39
 which involved an allegation of group formation without
any claim of purchases subsequent to the group formation. The
district court dismissed plaintiff's claim that the organization of a
group, the members of which owned, in the aggregate, more than
ten percent of an outstanding class of the issuer's equity securities,
triggered the filing requirement without any further purchases."
Holding that group formation itself was the triggering event, 4 ' the
Second Circuit reversed. The court based this conclusion on its
belief that
[t]he history and language of section 13(d) make it clear
that the statute was primarily concerned with disclosure of
potential changes in control resulting from new aggrega-
tions of stockholdings and was not intended to be restricted
to only individual stockholders who made future pur-
chases and whose actions were, therefore, more appar-
ent. 42
The GAF court's holding that group formation itself was the
event triggering the duty to report meant that if, after formation, a
group held in excess of the threshold percentage, "formation" would
constitute the equivalent of a statutory acquisition. In so deciding,
the Second Circuit broadened the scope of section 13(d) from a
simple requirement to file after an "overt act," i.e. , purchases of the
issuer's securities, to an attempt to regulate the kaleidoscope of
corporate control patterns. The court in GAF espoused the view that
the statutory purpose was the protection of the general investing
public in all circumstances involving pOtential shifts in corporate
control. Under GAF, the triggering acquisition 43 could occur prior
39 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971) (Kaufman, J.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). The
Bath Industries decision had been vigorously criticized in the interim before the GAF
decision. See generally Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439—Growing
Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. L.J. 654, 682-83
(1971); U. Pa. Comment, supra note 1, at 868-72. The Griffin & Tucker article criticizes the
Bath Industries court for its failure to recognize that group formation itself embodied an
acquisition triggering § 13(d)'s filing requirement. Griffin & Tucker, supra, at 682-84.
40 GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062, 1068 (S.D.N.V, 1971) (Pollack, J.).
41 453 F:2d at 718.
42 Id,
District Judge Pollack had urged in GAF that, although § 13(d) nowhere defined
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to the formation of group intent to acquire more shares. Of course,
that group intent may or may not have been the purpose or one of
the purposes for which the group was formed. The court indicated
concern with . the impact such rapid accumulations of particular
securities, aimed at controlling the issuer, might have upon the
market price of those securities." Its apparent policy judgment was
that requiring disclosure of the potential effect of the accumulation
at the earlier stage would more effectively fulfill the statutory
purpose."
Although it will become apparent" that GAF did settle the
issue of whether subsequent purchases are necessary to trigger sec-
tion 13(d)'s filing requirement, like Bath Industries it failed to
resolve the question of what constitutes a group. This difficult
problem was avoided by remanding 47
 to the district court for a
"acquisition," it was clear from the language of the statutes that an actual purchase was
contemplated. Believing the language of the statute to be clear, Judge Pollack disregarded
legislative history to the contrary and stated that "the words of the enactment control over the
inconsistent explanation of those who described the statute." 324 F. Supp. at 1067. The
Second Circuit sharply criticized this reasoning. In a note to its opinion it stated: "The
meaning of 'acquiring' hardly could be considered plain when two district court judges
recently failed to agree on whether an inheritance of stock was an 'acquisition.' " 453 F.2d at
716 n.14.
The two cases referred to were Sisak v. Wings & Wheels Express, Inc., [1970-71 Transfer
Binder." CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 92,991, at 90665 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and Ozark Air Lines,
Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971). The former had given the word "acquisi-
tion" a broad, unqualified interpretation by holding that the "passage" of securities from an
estate to the legatees under a will was an acquisition. [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 92,991, at 90668. Ozark Air Lines, on the other hand, held, under similar
circumstances and just as unqualifiedly, that § 13(d) was designed to reach only "purposeful"
acquisition. 326 F. Supp. at 1117. In neither case was there an issue of group formation.
44 See 453 F.2d at 717.
45
 See id. at 717-18.
46
 See text at notes 85-88 infra.
47 See 453 F.2d at 718, 722. Since the case was before the Second Circuit on the district
court's dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), the question was easily avoided. The
complaint alleged the formation of a group. It was the failure to allege subsequent purchases
that caused its earlier dismissal. 324 F. Supp. at 1064, 1071, 1073.
The Second Circuit's decision in GAF gave passing consideration to the question of
whether management groups whose members collectively own more than the threshold
percentage will be required to file. Judge Kaufman deemed the argument that such manage-
ment groups would be required to file "totally without substance," since "management groups
Per se are not customarily formed for the purpose of 'acquiring, holding, or disposing of
securities of [the] issuer' and would not be required to file unless the members conspired to
pool their securities (sic) interests for one of the stated purposes." 453 F.2d at 719. He noted:
The more difficult question, and a question we need not decide on this appeal,
is whether management groups which expressly agree to pool their interests to fight a
potential takeover are subject to section 1.3(d). Nor do we intimate any view on
whether an insurgent group which has filed under 13(d) and subsequently is success-
ful in its takeover bid remains subject to the section. In any event, as we have
already indicated, the Commission can forestall any untoward effects under the
exemptive power conferred upon it by section 13(d)(6)(0).
Id. at 719 n.20. Two years later, the Second Circuit resolved this question somewhat
perfunctorily in Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cit . , 1973). In
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determination as to whether the individuals involved indeed consti-
tuted a section 13(d)(3) group. District Judge Pollack was given a
difficult task; he had held that filing should be required only after
the members of a group unite in common purpose and acquire more
shares precisely because of his fear that "Rifle inherent difficulty of
ascertaining when a group was formed is akin to an attempt to
grasp quicksilver." 48
IV. FORMATION OF THE STATUTORY GROUP: THE CONTRIBUTION
OF SEC STAFF OPINIONS
On two occasions prior to GAF and once subsequently, the
SEC's Division of Corporate Finance has received inquiries49 seek-
ing advice regarding the staff's position on when section 13(d)(3)
groups are formed. Although each case lacks specific criteria, to-
gether they shed some light on this complex problem.
In April 1971, the staff of the SEC refused to take a no-action
position in Budd Co.," a situation in which twelve institutional
lenders received warrants to purchase about fourteen percent of the
issuer's common stock. Arguing in the letter of inquiry that the only
link of any one lender to any of the other lenders was the similarity
of the written agreements and the concurrent timing of the closing
for each loan, counsel claimed the absence of any "concerted action"
among the lenders.'" The staff replied that it was unable to agree
with counsel's conclusion that the transaction involved in the
placement did not require the group to file a Schedule 13D. 52 Since
the staff did not delineate reasons for its decision, one can only
that case the court held that, because § 14(d)(4) of the Act required disclosure of a target
company's affairs whenever the target's management advised its shareholders not to tender, §
13(d)(3) disclosure would be superfluous. ld. at 218. Accord, Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386
F. Supp. 44, 61-63 (D.N.J. 1974) (management group formed to further control).
" 324 F. Supp. at 1068.
49 The securities bar attributes great significance to these published inquiries and staff
responses. However, Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts with Existing Statutes,
Cases, and Commission Releases, 59 Va. L. Rev. 303 (1973), suggests that by bureaucratic
fiat, the SEC staff is creating substantive securities law inconsistent with relevant statutes,
case law, and formal administrative decisions. Id. at 319. Although the concept is a valuable
innovation, the SEC staff no-action letter has been widely abused and, consequently, the
regulatory scheme has suffered, Lowenfels suggests that the SEC should be bound to adhere
to existing precedents in certain areas such as § 13(d). Id. at 321.
5° [1970-71 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. SI 78,115, at 80414 (SEC Div.
Corp, Fin, Apr. 8, 1971).
51 Id. at 80415. Counsel for the Budd Company also argued that, since the loan was
made in the ordinary course of all the parties' business and did nut have as one of its purposes
the alteration of the issuer's control pattern, the entire transaction was outside the scope of
§ 13(d). Id. at 80416. Management was not only aware of the identity of the parties and the
source of their funds, but had also solicited their participation. It should be noted that the
Second Circuit decision in GAF had not been handed down at the time the letter of inquiry
was submitted to the staff.
52 Id, at 80414.
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speculate as to the significance of the ruling. The refusal to take a
no-action position may have resulted from a conclusion that the
transactions involved the possibility that lender influence would be
brought to bear on the Budd management. The large amount of
money involved ($30,000,000), the substantial equity relinquished
through the issuance of warrants (14%), and the fact that the lenders
conditioned the accomplishment of the transaction upon the aggre-
gate amount borrowed by the company equaling $30,000,000 53 may
have indicated to the staff that the transaction involved the possibil-
ity of a shift in Budd's control pattern rather than mere incurrence
of long-term debt. 54
 The staff apparently concluded that the invest-
ing public should know of the strong possibility of lender influence
on the company's management.
In (LS. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 55 another request for an SEC
staff no-action letter, three individuals concededly were accumulat-
ing more than the threshold percentage of the issuer's outstanding
common stock. Counsel for one of the three purchasers indicated to
the SEC staff that the individuals might seek representation on the
issuer's board of directors. However, counsel also stated that the
three had not entered into a written agreement and that "their intent
to hold the stock could- change from that of desiring representation
to holding it as an investment." 56 In its reply, the staff simply
paraphrased the language of section 13(d)(3), 57 leaving the unmis-
takable impression that group filing should occur when the aggre-
gate accumulation exceeded five percent.
In both Rubber Reclaiming and Budd the staff's position ap-
peared to be based upon an extremely broad interpretation of sec-
tion 13(d). In Budd, the only evidence of concerted action among
the lenders was the concurrent timing of the loan closings and the
similarity of the agreement forms, both of which were conditions
required by the issuer. 58 In Rubber Reclaiming, the absence of a
written agreement among the three purchasers was apparently con-
sidered insignificant. 59 Moreover, the staff reply gave no indication
that the admitted present intent of the purchasers to gain represen-
53
 Id. at 80414-15. Counsel did not actually specify whether any lender could cancel its
participation if the total borrowings did not equal $30,000,000.
54
 For example, if there were provisions regarding the maintenance of specified amounts
of working capital, as is common in many such direct placements, see American Bar
Foundation, Commentaries on Indentures 452 (1971), the lenders may justifiably have ex-
pected to have more than just minimum influence on the company's management.
15
 [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'II 78,585, at 81258 (SEC Div.





 [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,115, at 80415.
59
 [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,585, at 81258.
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tation on the board of the issuer was particularly important. 6°
However, it was probably of significance to the staff that two or
more individuals had been acting in concert in aggregating more
than the threshold precentage of securities.
It should be noted that both of these rulings, although subse-
quent to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bath Industries, 6 ' were
made prior to the Second Circuit decision in GAF. Presumably the
Seventh Circuit would have imposed the duty to file in Budd only
upon a subsequent purchase by at least one of the lenders and in
Rubber Reclaiming, upon the next purchase after the purchases by
the three individuals had brought them to the triggering percentage.
However, under the Second Circuit's analysis in GAF, the duty to
file might never have been triggered in either Budd or Rubber
Reclaiming, since in neither case did the applicable letter of inquiry
indicate evidence from which could be drawn the inference that the
group possessed the requisite view to control. In this sense, then, the
SEC staff's view of section 13(d)(3) was apparently much broader
than the judicial views formulated in either Bath Industries or
GAF.
Any uncertainty regarding the staff's view of section 13(d) was
dispelled in March 1972. Shortly after the Second Circuit's decision
in GAF, inquiry was made by counsel for a committee of note
holders who were to receive warrants to purchase common stock in
a complicated refinancing transaction involving the Great Southwest
Corporation. b 2 In the aggregate, these warrants were exercisable for
about fifteen percent of the outstanding common stock of the issuer.
Counsel argued that the members of his committee as well as the
other note holders were, together with numerous other institutions,
simply creditors of a corporation in severe need of refinancing."
The issuer would be unable to borrow the appropriate funds unless
each of the creditors simultaneously consented to the terms of the
refinancing. According to counsel, since the issuance of the warrants
was merely an incidental part of the refinancing, the note holders
would not acquire the warrants as -a group but as individual cred-
itors of the same class." The staff in Great Southwest ruled that
6° Id.
61 Counsel for Budd Company had cited Bath Industries as support for his position that
concerted action among the participants was required before group formation could occur.
[1970-71 Transfer Binden CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,115, at 80415. The staff apparently
did not disagree with counsel's theoretical position—only with his assertion that the kinds of
activity present in the loan transaction did not rise to the level of "concerted."
62 Great Southwest Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,714,
at 81504 (SEC Div. Corp. Fin. Apr. 3, 1972).
62
 Id. at 81507.
64 Id. Counsel for the note holder-warrant recipients in Great Southwest argued, as had
counsel for Budd, that this was "not the type of activity which was intended to be regulated
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the recipients of the warrants in the proposed refinancing program
did constitute a "group" and thus a "person" within the meaning of
section 13(d)(3). 65 Crucial to the staff's ruling was the evidence that
acceptance of the plan of refinancing by each individual creditor
was conditioned upon its acceptance by all other creditors. From
this fact the staff reasoned that the recipients of the warrants were
acting in concert for the purposes of the refinancing transaction. 66
The resultant statutory duty to file as a section 13(d)(3) group was,
in the staff's view, 67 based upon the acquisition of beneficial owner-
ship of more than five percent of the outstanding shares of any
outstanding class of the issuer's equity securities. 68
Despite the staff's Great Southwest ruling that the recipients of
the warrants would constitute a section 13(d)(3) group, the fact that
the creditors received warrants not exercisable for one year resulted
in the staff's decision that the initial receipt of these warrants did
not involve a present acquisition which would otherwise trigger
immediately the section 13(d)(1) filing requirement. The staff ruled
that under Rule 13d-3 69 the common stock underlying the warrants
by the Williams Act." Id. Assuming that the overall purpose of that legislation was to regulate
the tender offer, counsel was probably correct. Given, however, the more specific statements
in the legislative history regarding potential alterations in an issuer's control pattern, counsel's
view may have been too narrow. See, e.g., the language of H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong, & Ad. News at 2818, to the effect that
13(d)(3) was designed to obtain full disclosure of the identity of "any... group obtaining the
benefits of ownership of securities by reason of any contract, understanding, relationship,
agreement or other arrangement." [Emphasis added.]
65 [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,714, at 81505.
66 Id.
67
 Id. The staff did not indicate what it meant by a "statutory obligation." The reply
does, however, make it quite clear that the fact that control of the issuer was lodged in a
parent corporation not a member of the group did not affect such obligation. Id. Obviously,
the staff is moving toward the position that while concerted action is crucial to group
formation, it need not be taken with a view to control in order to trigger the filing require-
ment.
Counsel for the note holders advanced another argument, id. at 81508, based on
§ 13(d)(6)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(D) (1970), which exempts:
[Ajny acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security which the Commission, by
rules or regulations or by order, shall exempt from the provisions of this subsection
[13(d)] as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect of, changing
or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the
purposes of this subsection.
The Commission has never promulgated a rule pursuant to this authority.
69
 Rule 13d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1974), states:
In determining, for the purposes of section 13(d) . . . whether a person is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of securities of any class, such person shall
be deemed to be the beneficial owner of securities of such class which such person
has the right to acquire through the exercise of presently exercisable options, war-
rants or rights or through the conversion of presently convertible securities, or
otherwise. The securities subject to such options, warrants, rights or conversion
privileges held by a person shall be deemed to be outstanding for the purpose of
computing the percentage of outstanding securities of the class owned by such person
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need not be considered for the purposes of Section 13(d)(1) until the
warrants became exercisable, at which time the underlying common
stock would be deemed acquired regardless of whether or not the
warrants were exercised."
The staff refused to speculate on whether the creditors would
be acting as a statutory group at the time the warrants became
exercisable. Apparently when the present refinancing plan closed
and the warrants were received, the note holder-warrant recipients
would no longer exist as a group within the meaning of section
13(d)(3) since the SEC staff understood 71 that the holders were
acting in concert solely for the purpose of the refinancing plan. The
obligation to file at a time in the future when the warrants became
exercisable would not arise merely because the holders had been a
group at the time of the initial receipt of the warrants. Filing would
be required only if the holders, at that time, constituted a statutory
group holding in excess of five percent of the issuer's common
stock. 72
Consistent with its ruling in Budd and Rubber Reclaiming, the
staff in Great Southwest declined to read a purpose to control test
into the acting in concert provision of section 13(d)(3), 73 and in so
doing again indicated its desire to read section 13(d) expansively.
This expansive interpretation could engender a fear that after Great
Southwest, SEC injunctive proceedings, predicated on a failure to
file a Schedule 13D, could be instituted against those shareholders
who owned, in the aggregate, more than the threshold five percent
and who merely had discussed the performance of the issuer's man-
agement. Under the staff's apparent reading of the section, all that
would have to be shown would be action in concert and ownership
of the threshold percentage. 74
An analysis of the SEC position in the Great. Southwest ruling
should include a consideration of the Second Circuit's earlier opinion
in GAF. Even when the Second Circuit's requirement of concerted
action with a view to control is applied to the SEC rulings, the
fundamental question remains as to what constitutes a "view to
but shall not be deemed to be outstanding for the purpose of computing the
percentage of the class owned by any other person.
[Emphasis added.]
'° [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,714, at 81505.
7 ' Id.
72 Id. The position that the requisite beneficial interest does not accrue until the warrants
become presently exercisable was recently confirmed. FAS Ina Inc., [1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep. 11 79,948, at 84444-45 (SEC Div. Corp. Fin. Aug. 8, 1974).
[1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,714, at 81505-06.
74
 To date no SEC injunctive proceedings have been filed. Management attorneys,
however, continue to utilize this extraordinarily successful tactical device. E.g., Cook
United, Inc. v. Shulman, Civ, No. 74-379 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 1974) (complaint).
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control." The staff may have been more likely to infer the existence
of a view to control from the circumstances of Budd or Rubber
Reclaiming than from the facts in Great Southwest. In the Great
Southwest ruling the staff did note the fact that the acceptance of
the plan by each note holder was dependent upon the acceptance of
the plan by all other note holders. The staff conceded, however,
that the entire relationship between the note holders existed solely
for the purpose of the refinancing transaction. Nevertheless, because
the transaction would result in ownership of more than the
threshold five percent limit, the participants were within the staff's
definition of a section 13(d)(3) group. 75 There is no evidence that
control of the corporation was a factor important to the note holders
or considered legally relevant by the staff of the SEC.
The effect of Great Southwest, if followed, may be that
whenever simultaneous acquisitions, by any means and for any
purpose, are made by two or more persons, filing will be required,
provided that the resulting aggregation of securities is in excess of
the threshold five percent. On the other hand, if no purchases are
involved, concerted activity alone may be enough to trigger the
filing requirement if the participants already own in the aggregate
the threshold percentage of shares. The question of what constitutes
concerted activity is still open, but, under the SEC view, the neces-
sary level of participation for purposes of the statute is not particu-
larly high." The attorney who seeks solace through application for
a no-action letter might better utilize his time in compiling the
appropriate information to complete his client's Schedule 13D.
V. FORMATION OF THE STATUTORY GROUP: RECENT JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS
Three months after the Second Circuit's decision in GAF, the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island decided
Nicholson File Co. v. H. K. Porter Co.," which involved an attempt
75 [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1] 78,714, at 81505.
76
 This SEC staff position was not unpredictable. The authors of the•Griffin & Tucker
article, supra note 39, were, respectively, the Chief and a member of the staff of the Small
Issues Branch of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance. They give several examples of
Schedule 13D filings where group formation occurred without the view to control requirement
imposed by GAF. Griffin & Tucker, supra note 39, at 685-86. However, the level of concerted
activity in those examples does appear higher than that of the note holder-warrant recipients
in Great Southwest.
Shortly before this article went to press, the SEC's Division of Investment Management
Regulation, queried about the application of § 13(d)(3) to several investment companies with a
common investment advisor, replied that the terms of the statute required a filing without
regard to whether the companies were "acting in concert." Stewart Fund Managers Ltd.,
[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 80,047, at 84886-87 (SEC Div. Inv, Mgmt.
Reg, Aug. 9, 1974),
77
 341 F. Supp. 508 (D.R.I. 1972).
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by Thomas M. Evans 78 to gain control of the Nicholson File Com-
pany (Nicholson). Sometime during 1969, Evans, the H. K. Porter
Company (Porter), and several nominee companies controlled by
Evans, purchased more than five percent of Nicholson's stock."
During the next two years, Evans and several high-ranking
employees of Porter approached the management of Nicholson con-
cerning their desire to discuss a merger. On each occasion the
Nicholson management rejected Evans' overtures on the ground
that such a merger would precipitate a Justice Department inquiry
into a possible antitrust violation. 80 Not until March 1972, more
than two years later, did Evans and Porter institute a tender offer
for the stock of Nicholson. The cash to pay for the stock to be
acquired by the tender offer was raised by spinning off, through a
public offering of its securities, the wholly-owned Porter subsidiary,
a method of raising capital which could also solve any antitrust
problems. Within ten days after the institution of the tender offer,
Porter duly filed the Schedule 13D. 8 '
Nicholson's management contended that Evans, Porter (of
which Evans owned fifty-one percent of the stock), Reb & Co. (a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Porter), and Evans & Co. (a New York
stock brokerage firm) constituted a section 13(dX3) group. 82 Conced-
ing that Evans controlled all of the members of the group, plaintiff
urged that several legal personalities were involved and that a
pooling of interests of those personalities to acquire control of
Nicholson had occurred. 83 Alternatively, plaintiff argued that even
if only one individual were involved, "the intent of that individual,
a 5% beneficial owner since December 22, 1970, to acquire control
of Nicholson [would trigger the] application of § 13(d) without
further acquisition of interest in the Nicholson stock." 84
In rejecting both of plaintiff's contentions, Judge Pettine ini-
tially examined the legislative history of the Williams Act. 85 He
concluded that:
The fact that	 13(d) calls for disclosure after acquisition,
whether acquisition is by an individual or by the pooling of
interests of a group, indicates an intention not to give
7g For a synopsis of Evans' takeover activities in years prior to his attempts to alter
Nicholson's control pattern, see Barnett, Tom Evans' Take•Overs Build a Vast Fortune, Stir
Hot Controversy, Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
"9 All purchases were made prior to December 22, 1970, the date when the lower (5
percent) triggering percentage became effective. 341 F. 5upp. at 518.
a" Id. at 515.
Id. at 512.
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information by way of disclosure useful to block acquisi-
tion but rather an intention to divulge information of the
potential effects such acquisition will have in the invest-
ment. 86-
Relying on GAF, Judge Pettine reasoned that an actual intent on the
part of a group to acquire more shares in or to acquire control of
the issuer is irrelevant to the purpose of section 13(d) and that, to
the contrary, the filing requirement is triggered simply by "the
formation of the group in common purpose."87
The court's reliance on GAF for this conclusion may be mis-
placed. If the Nicholson court meant that group formation occurred
when there was a coming together for any common purpose related
to the issuer, then its position is closer to that of the SEC staff in
Great Southwest than to that of the Second Circuit in GAF. The
decision in GAF was rendered upon a fact situation in which there
was a group intent to gain, or at least a view toward gaining,
control of the issuer. 88 The question upon which the court in GAF
focused was whether the mere formation of the group constituted a
statutory "acquisition" sufficient to impose the filing requirement.
On further analysis, Nicholson's contention that the formation
of an intent to acquire more shares in or an intent to acquire con-
trol of an issuer triggers the statutory duty to file appears to be
merely a logical extension of the SEC staff position in Great South-
west. As information used in an investor's valuation of the issuer's
stock, knowledge that an individual who already owns in excess of
the threshold percentage has made a decision to attempt to alter the
control pattern of the issuer would seem as important as knowledge
that there has been a recent accumulation in excess of that percent-
age, whether or not there is an intent to acquire more shares.
Holding that, regardless of whether a group or an individual con-
trolled the shares, no accumulation above the applicable threshold
had occurred after December 22, 1970, the court found no viola-
tion. 89 Even if a "group" had been involved, the court further
reasoned, such a group would not be one "formed to 'acquire, hold,
or dispose' " of the issuer's shares. 9 ° Relying upon the rationale of
GAF, the court concluded that the defendants had incurred no duty
to file and indicated its belief that slowly acquired blocks of se-
" Id. at 517-18.
87 Id. at 518.
88 453 F.2d 709, 717-18 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). See text at
notes 43-45 supra.
59 341 F. Supp. at 518. The court had earlier pointed out that no retroactive filing
requirement was incurred by the Evans group simply because the threshold percentage was
reduced by Congress on December 22, 1970, from 10 to 5 percent. Id. at 517.
99
 Id. at 518.
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curities do not represent the kind of potential alterations of an
issuer's control pattern toward which Congress directed the disclos-
ure requirements of the Williams Act."
In what may be the significant portion of the court's opinion,
Judge Pettine explored the motives of the Evans group. Although it
had ruled that section 13(d)(1) was not applicable to the defendants,
the court assumed, arguendo, that it was applicable, and then
further assumed any intent of the defendant to acquire control of
Nicholson had been formed prior to January 1972, and, in fact, as
far back as 1969. 92 However, in the court's view such intent was
qualified and was not sufficiently definite. Moreover, even if there
was an agreement to acquire Nicholson, it was "necessarily depen-
dent on the meeting of several prior substantial conditions," 93 the
most important of which were: (1) the success of a public offering of
a subsidiary of one of the defendants; and (2) the subsequent divesti-
ture of the subsidiary so as to avoid a possible violation of section 7
of the Clayton Act." In other words, the defendant Porter was seen
as in no position to "agree" to acquire."
The issuer argued that Porter should have filed before or soon
after divestiture proceedings began on January 1, 1972, but that
filing did not occur until after a meeting of the defendants in late
February." At that meeting, alternate uses of the proceeds of the
sale of the subsidiary were discussed, but not until March 3 was the
decision made to use the proceeds for a tender offer to Nicholson's
shareholders. 97 The court held that if filing had occurred within ten
days after the January 1 meeting, the filing would have been "pre-
mature, . . . vague, and indefinite," since the divestiture of the
Porter subsidiary might not have been successful, and consequently
the tender offer might never have been made. 98 It then stated that
Nicholson was incorrect in suggesting that Congress had intended to
require a five percent shareholder to file upon each of several possi-
ble plans before he reasonably could have chosen among alternative
plans." The court warned of the danger of filing at a time when the
" Id.
92 Id. at 518-19.
97 ki. at 519.
94
 15 U.S.C. § IS ( 1970).
95 341 F. Supp. at 519.
98 Id. at 518-19.
92
 Id. at 519. The court did not comment on what its holding would have been had
members of the post-March 3 group made individual purchases prior to that date. It is
relevant that no purchases of Nicholson stock were made by any member of the Evans faction
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disclosed information would be open to challenge as being inade-
quate or inaccurate due to overstatement or understatement)" In
other words, at the points in time at issue, when plans were neces-
sarily contingent, filing would not serve the legislative purpose of
protecting the investor and should not be required)°'
The guideline suggested by the Nicholson decision is that a
close examination of circumstantial evidence is essential to a deter-
mination of group formation and common purpose. The analytic
emphasis should not be on the question of whether the group has
formulated common intent to gain or to alter control of the issuer. It
should not matter that some members of the group are selling their
shares (or granting voting proxies) to other members. Instead, the
emphasis should be on the question of whether the group has been
formed with a common purpose relevant to the acquisition, holding,
or disposal of the issuer's shares, regardless of its control motive. It
is at that point in time that the filing requirement will be triggered,
if the members of that group own in the aggregate the threshold
percentage of shares.
An examination of such circumstantial evidence may show,
however, that while there are a number of plans each one of which
has as its ultimate purpose a control alteration of the issuer, those
plans are, in fact, a series of indefinite, possibly vague, alternatives.
If these "plans" represent no more than options to the individuals
discussing them, there will be no group formation and thus no trigger-
ing of the filing requirement. However, at the time the, individual
members choose one of the alternatives there will then exist among
them a common purpose and they will be considered members of a
section 13(d)(3) group which must file the appropriate Schedule 13D
1 ' 1° Id.
101 The Nicholson court took its cue on this question of premature disclosure from two
circuit court opinions in the tender offer area. In Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur
Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth Circuit stated, in the context of a genuine cash
tender offer.
The person or corporation filing a Schedule 13D statement . . . must ... be
precise and forthright in making full and fair disclosure as to all material facts called
for by the various items of the schedule. At the same time he must be careful not to
delineate extravagantly or to enlarge beyond reasonable bounds. The securities
market is delicately arranged and needs only slight impetus to upset it.
Id. at 1085. Earlier, in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1969), Judge Friendly indicated that lilt would be as serious an infringement of these
[SEC] regulations to overstate the definiteness of the plans as to understate them." Id. at 948.
See also Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
991, 1001-02 (1973). Obviously, the Nicholson court was concerned with the burden placed on
the group, its members, and on counsel if they were required to describe a series of alterna-
tives together with the probability of each one's occurrence. For an excellent discussion of the
method by which an investor should calculate such probabilities, see generally C. j. Grayson,
The Use of Statistical Techniques in Capital Budgeting, in Financial Research and Manage-
ment Decisions 98-107 (A. Robichek ed. 1967).
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within ten days. Viewed in this perspective, the Nicholson decision
makes good sense. Unfortunately, other recent decisions have not
further explicated its solid rationale.
In contrast to the logical reasoning of the court in Nicholson is
the decision of the court in Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v.
American Consumer Industries, Inc. (ACI). 102 That case involved
ACI's attempt to enjoin an insurgent solicitation of proxies for its
annual meeting scheduled for April 24, 1973. Water & Wall had
been incorporated on December 20, 1972 for the purpose of acquir-
ing AC1 shares. Its four officers, who owned nearly all of Water &
Wall's outstanding shares, were also officers and directors of Mer-
chants Investors Corporation (MIC), a broker-dealer which was a
signatory of a December 20, 1972 agreement (part of which was the
incorporation of Water & Wall) to gain control of ACI. 103 MIC later
assigned the agreement to Water & Wall. Defendants conceded that
a group had been formed as a result of the signing of the incorpora-
tion agreement on December 20, 1972. Filing occurred on Janu-
ary 2, 1973. Plaintiff contended that group formation had occurred
much earlier—during the fall of 1972—and, hence, that the re-
quested injunctive relief against the proxy solicitation was ap-
propriate.'"
Plaintiff relied on a series of meetings which had taken place
between the various principals of Water & Wall and several other
shareholders of ACI prior to the December 20 memorialization of
the agreement.' 05 Lendman, one of the principals of Water & Wall
acting for MIC at the time, met with one Appel, a three percent
shareholder of ACI "sometime prior to November 16, 1972," 1 " and
discussed the possibility of a proxy contest against ACI's manage-
ment. After considering the matter, and discussing it with several
other shareholders, Appel wrote a letter, dated November 16, 1972,
stating that he was prepared to participate in the plan which Lend-
man had outlined. On December 6, Appel spoke with one Alexan-
der, who owned or controlled approximately 22,500 ACI shares.'"
Alexander later met with MIC's counsel and agreed that he and
Appel "would join MIC in some type of joint voting arrange-
ment.""° . By this time, several other shareholders had been con-
tacted and had indicated their willingness to join a plan once it was
102 [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 411 93,943, at 93752	 1973).
03 Id. at 93753.
104 Id.
I" Id. at 93755.
1°6 Id.
1°7 Id, at 937S6. Since the number of shares outstanding at the time was 580,000,
approximately 29,000 were required to trigger the filing requirement. Id. at 93756 n.3.
1°14 Id. at 93755.
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put together. On December 13, 1972, Alexander received a draft of
a shareholder agreement in substantially the same form as the one
ultimately executed on December 20. The December 20th agreement
provided that no later than forty-eight hours after the purchase of
50,000 shares of ACI by MIC, Appel and Alexander would deliver
irrevocable proxies for not less than 42,964 shares of ACI. On the
same date, December 20, MIC fulfilled its promise and purchased
over 50,000 shares of ACI. 1 °9
Defendants asserted that there was no agreement to work in
concert until December 20. Citing Nicholson as support for their
contention,' '° they argued that until the agreement was signed on
December 20, there were substantial barriers to any agreement. In
addition, defendants claimed that the agreement could not go into
effect until MIC met the condition subsequent of purchasing the
50,000 shares. Underlying the defendants' arguments seemed to be
the implicit contention that until all parties to the agreement com-
mitted themselves to its precise terms, there was no coming together
in common purpose and thus no group formation necessary to
trigger the filing requirement.'" The court rejected the defendant's
reliance on Nicholson, and held that the conditions claimed by the
defendants to exist in this case did not approach "the substantialness
of the conditions in Nicholson and actually amountled] to nothing
more than consideration—the delivery of proxies for the guarantee
that they would be joining a persuasive force, ft112 The promise to
deliver shares was not sufficiently conditioned on the assent of
another group member so as to postpone the defendants' obligation
to file.
Despite the court's refusal to find no group formation under the
Nicholson rationale in this situation, Water & Wall may be consis-
tent with the Nicholson decision. The prior conditions in Nicholson,
though not independent of the plan, were indeed less likely to occur.
The success of Porter's plan in Nicholson depended upon the taking
of certain specific action by parties outside the membership of the
group. 13 It was necessary that an investment banking firm agree to
underwrite the issue of the Porter subsidiary, that a registration
statement be prepared and filed, that the SEC effectuate the regis-
tration statement, and that the Justice Department's Antitrust Divi-
sion approve the divestiture. On the other hand, the conditions in
Water & Wall were almost certain to materialize. The purchase of
109 Id .
u °
 Id. at 93756.
I See id,
112 Id .
1 " See text at notes 93-94 supra.
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shares and the delivery of irrevocable proxies were foregone conclu-
sions by the time the agreement was memorialized in a writing on
December 20. Thus, the theory of substantial prior conditions es-
poused in Nicholson does not appear applicable to the facts in Water
& Wall. Both Nicholson and Water & Wall, then, have moved the
impact zone of section 13(d)(3) beyond the position of the Second
Circuit in GAF and toward the SEC staff position announced in
Great Southwest.
The difficulties that courts have with the concept of concerted
activity under section 13(d)(3) is further illustrated by the case of
Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 114 which will be reviewed by the
Supreme Court this year. Although both the district court and
Seventh Circuit opinions focused on the proper relief to be afforded
plaintiff, the case is instructive on the extent to which courts will
inquire into the quality of the activity involved before concluding
that the purchases have caused a section 13(dX3) group to form.
In Mosinee, nine defendants conceded that the obligation to file
had been triggered in May 1971, but argued successfully in the
district court that because a subsequent, albeit untimely, filing was
made, and because there was an absence of any covert conduct on
their part against the issuer or its management, injunctive relief was
not warranted." 5
 The acquisition of plaintiff's • shares was
spearheaded by Francis Rondeau, whose periodic purchases, on his
own and through the vehicle of several corporations he controlled
reached the threshold of five percent in May 1971. In April of that
year Mosinee's president became aware that Rondeau recently had
made several substantial purchases of Mosinee stock. Although the
number of shares purchased had not reached the triggering percent-
age, the president, who was aware, of the "associational identity" of
the purchasers, 16 inquired as to Rondeau's reasons for the pur-
chases. Rondeau stated somewhat disingenuously that he believed
the stock to be underpriced and a good investment, that he intended
to continue purchases until he held about 40,000 shares, and
further, that he was "perfectly happy" with the management and
operation of Mosinee in general. 17 Rondeau apparently was not
aware of the five percent filing threshold although there was evi-
14
 354 F. Supp. 686 {W.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 653 (1974).
" 5 354 F. Supp. at 693-96. Mosinee had sought, inter atia, an injunction restraining the
defendants: (1) from voting any Mosinee common stock held or acquired in violation of the
Exchange Act; (2) from using such stock as collateral to secure funds for the purpose of
acquiring control of Mosinee; and {3) from acquiring additional Mosinee common stock "until
the effects of the Exchange Act] violations [had] been fully dissipated." Id. at 688.
"6 500 F.2d at 1019 (Pell, J., dissenting).
"7 354 F. Supp. at 689.
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dente presented that he was aware of the old ten percent
threshold. 118
 Subsequent to the aforementioned conversation,
Mosinee's management continued to monitor Rondeau's purchases
and, in July 1971, when those purchases reached approximately
60,000 shares, sent him a letter stating that his activity in Mosinee
stock may have created problems under the federal securities laws.
No further purchases were accomplished after July 30, the date
when Rondeau, shortly - after receiving Mosinee's letter, consulted an
attorney. Filing occurred on August 25, 1971, approximately three
months after the defendants admitted it should have occurred.' i 9
Shortly thereafter, Mosinee instituted its action, requesting among
other things, injunctive relief against further stock purchases by the
defendants.' 20
Notwithstanding the defendants' admission that their discharge
of the duty to file was tardy, the district court held that it would be
inappropriate to award the relief sought by Mosinee.' 21 In granting
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court
stated that Mosinee had not documented facts sufficient to show
irreparable injury to the corporation.' 22 The court then noted that,
even without concluding that irreparable harm is a prerequisite to
injunctive relief, the situation in Mosinee provided "a particularly
inappropriate occasion [for' equitable relief." 123 First, the only
"harm" Mosinee documented was the "anxiety" which could be
expected to accompany any change in management, a predictable
consequence of shareholder democracy. 124 Secondly, there was
ample evidence that defendants' purchases were open and notorious
and were not the kinds of secret accumulations to which section
13(d) was addressed.' 25 Finally, the court noted that all of the
information necessary to dissipate the effect of any purchases in
violation of section 13(d) had been available since late September
115 Id. at 690.
114
 Id. at 690, 693.
12° Id. at 693-96.
121 Id. at 696.
122 Id. at 693.
123 Id. at 694.
124
 Id. This position taken by the district court in Mosinee should be contrasted with
that of the district court in Bath Industries, 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 427
F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), where the main reason given for enjoining the Blot group from
engaging in a proxy contest was the fear that such a struggle would "chill" the company's
chances for securing a lucrative government shipbuilding contract. 305 F. Supp. at 538. See
text at note 28 supra. The Mosinee court distinguished Bash, noting that in that case
"irreparable injury to the corporation, as distinguished from its present management, flowed
from the covert conduct of the defendants . . . ." 354,F, Supp. at 695.
125 354 E. Supp. at 694-95.
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1971, and was available at the time the motion for summary judg-
ment was brought.' 26
On appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed,'" thus extinguishing
any remaining vitality of its Bath Industries' 28 decision. The court
noted its agreement with the Second Circuit's analysis in GAF, and
indicated approval of GAF's interpretation of section 13(d) as being
intended "to alert the marketplace of every large, rapid aggregation
or accumulation of securities, regardless of technique employed,
which might represent a potential shift in corporate control." 129
Since this language in GAF was central to the distinction drawn by
the GAF court between its analysis of section 13(d) and that of the
Seventh Circuit in Bath Industries, the Seventh Circuit appears to
have overruled its Bath Industries holding that the section 13(d)
filing requirement is not triggered without an agreement to act in
concert to acquire additional shares.'"
Had the Seventh Circuit stopped there, the decision would
have provided increased uniformity among the circuits but little real
enlightenment. However, in reversing the district court and direct-
ing that an injunction be entered against Rondeau and his
associates, 131 the court of appeals went much further. While GAF
had focused on equity accumulations of more than five percent
acquired with a view to control, the Seventh Circuit went well
beyond that barrier and placed within the statute any accumulation
in excess of five percent where "the purchaser portends the potential
to effectuate a change in control."' 32 The court gave two reasons for
its broad construction. First, Congress had deemed it necessary that
both management and the general investing public should be able,
when such potential arises, to assess the impact of the possible
control alteration in valuing the issuer's securities. Second, man-
agement must be allowed an opportunity to respond appropriately
to the newly-existing potential for a shift in control.' 33
Whether the Seventh Circuit's language in Mosinee will reduce
the factual analysis necessary to find a section 13(d) violation to a
mere mathematical calculation,' 34 without inquiry into the
126 Id. at 695.
129 500 F.2d at 1017.
126 Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970). See text at notes 27-34
supra.
129 500 F.2d at 1016, quoting GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971).
139 See text at notes 30-33 supra.
131 500 F.2d at 1017.
132 Id. at 1016.
133 Id.
134 In other words, if N = .05(S) where N = number of shares acquired and S -= the
number of shares of the class outstanding, then the filing provision has been triggered.
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purchaser's possible intent to alter the corporation's pattern of con-
trol, is difficult to determine. The use of the word "portend" to-
gether with the concept of shift in issuer control indicates that the
accumulating process engaged in prior to the triggering acquisition
must be carried on in a way foretelling an attempt to alter the
issuer's control pattern. On the other hand, the court stated that: "It
is clear from the language of the Act that Congress intended to
include within the scope of the reporting requirements those transac-
tions entered into for investment purposes and not control." 135
 This
language seems to indicate that, in the view of the Seventh Circuit,
failure to file would be a per se violation. If, on the other hand, the
court's prior reference to corporate control, 136
 is accepted as
definitive, then the view to control condition to imposition of the
statutory duty, required by the GAF court, is at least partially
retained.
The effect that the Seventh Circuit's analysis will have on the
problem of group formation is also somewhat uncertain. Neither the
majority nor the dissenting opinion in Mosinee cited section 13(d)(3)
or discussed the statutory problem of group formation.' 37
 Both
opinions apparently assumed that Rondeau alone had been respon-
sible for the entire accumulation.' 38
 The failure of the court to
discuss this issue is unfortunate since the contrast with the analysis
of the Williams Act's purpose would have been worthwhile. It is one
thing to state that, if an accumulation has occurred, regardless of
motive, filing must follow. It is an entirely different matter to state
that several persons, none of whom have purchased an additional
share, have engaged in concerted activity with respect to the issuer
such that a statutory accumulation has resulted. Nevertheless, with
some interpolation, the group formation problem can be analyzed in
the context of the facts of Mosinee.
There is nothing in the district court's opinion in Mosinee to
indicate that the "crystallization" of plans, prior to the consultation
with the attorney, had hinged on substantial prior conditions or that
the crystallization had been the result of a selection process which
contemplated a choice from several vague options. The Mosinee
135
 500 F.2d at 1016 n.4,
136
 See text at note 132 supra.
13 ? The district court opinion, however, set out in detail that Rondeau was not the only
purchaser, and that he did not personally purchase in excess of the triggering percentage. 354
F. Supp. at 691. But since the defendants had earlier conceded that a violation of § 13(d)'s
filing requirement had occurred, such discussion, except as it related to the remedy, was
unnecessary.
138
 See 500 F.2d at 1014-15 (majority opinion); id. at 1019-20 (dissenting opinion).
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defendants, unlike the Nicholson defendants,' 39 seem to have been
waiting for the right moment at which to strike.'" Furthermore,
Judge Doyle's opinion passed over Rondeau's less than candid re-
sponse to the inquiry of Mosinee's president as to the reason for the
stock purchases, t 41
 and the fact that after receiving the warning
letter, Rondeau himself placed no more purchase orders, though
other defendants did. When Rondeau was first queried as to his
purpose, approximately 18,000 shares had been purchased; when
the issuer's warning letter was received, the group had accumulated
just over the threshold percentage. Yet by the time the late filing oc-
curred, the defendants had accumulated close to an eight percent
equity interest. 142
 Such deliberate deception in the light of sub-
sequent events should have been sufficient to show the defendants'
"covert conduct," or, in Second Circuit's language, "view to con-
trol," or, in Nicholson's language, "common purpose."
As has been demonstrated earlier, a section 13(03) group's
duty to file is the result, not only of group holdings in excess of the
threshold percentage, but also of a group attitude, whether judi-
cially termed a "view to control," a "firm agreement," or a "common
purpose." Thus, the Mosinee issuer should have been entitled to
relief on the basis of the defendants' admission (showing the requi-
site attitude as of May 1 7) and the covert accumulations to try to
obtain control (evidenced by Rondeau's less than candid reaction to
the issuer's inquiry as to his intent and by a late filing motivated
only by fear of litigation for failure to file). Had the district court
1 " Sec text at notes 92-95 supra.
i" At the time of the district court decision in Mosinee, Judge Doyle had only the
conduct of the defendants in Bath as a basis of comparison in determining whether covert,
conspiratorial conduct had occurred. The issues of group formation and duty to file could,
however, have been readily resolved by using the Nicholson concept of prior substantial
conditions. Under that theory the court might easily have inferred that the defendants were
pursuing their course of accumulation until the right moment. Given the record of accumula-
tion by the defendants and the poor earnings record of the issuer (which had recently reduced
its dividend), 354 F, Supp. at 688, the trial court could have further inferred high shareholder
receptivity to a tender offer. Certainly this receptiveness was indicated by a market rise in the
stock from thirteen to twenty-one dollars per share a few days after the late filing. More
importantly, an examination by the court of the Schedule 13D would have shown that the
defendants were considering borrowing 3.6 million dollars for the purchase of an additional
thirty percent equity interest in Mosinee. These circumstances should have indicated that the
defendants had, on May 17, agreed to try to obtain control, and were simply biding their time
until the right moment to make the tender offer. If the financing referred to was a substantial
condition to the formulation of a common purpose, under the rationale of Nicholson the court
could have tolled the filing period until the financing became a virtual certainty. On the other
hand, if obtaining the financing seemed a foregone conclusion, then the district court should
have allowed the issuer equitable relief.
141 See text at note 117 supra.
MS 354 F. Supp. at 690-91.
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decision been affirmed, it would have created a strained and un-
necessary distinction between the duty to file because of concerted
activity and the duty to file because of covert, conspiratorial action
to obtain control.
The date of group formation was crucial in Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Canada Development Corp., 143
 a decision rendered by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Late in the
afternoon of July 24, 1973, the Canada Development Corporation
(CDC) gave notice to the management of Texasgulf that it was
about to announce a tender offer for the stock of Texasgulf, which,
if successful, would result in CDC control of that world-wide,
publicly-owned mining and chemical company. Texasgulf quickly
sought an injunction restraining CDC from proceeding with its
tender offer, alleging, inter alia, securities and antitrust violations,
conspiracy, and possible conflict of interest. 144 Although the section
13(d) issue was clearly a subsidiary one, the Texasgulf court's treat-
ment of that issue is instructive. It illustrates the fact that the
federal district courts are heavily influenced by the GAF rationale.
Plaintiff's attempt to show group formation was ingenious.
CDC, the principal defendant, had carefully limited its open market
purchases so as not to exceed, together with the purchase of another
company with whom it hoped to conduct the tender offer as a joint
venture, the five percent triggering percentage. Thus, Texasgulf
alleged that Louis R. Desmarais, a vice chairman and director of
CDC who was also the president of a large Canadian utility which,
in turn, held a controlling interest in two companies possessing
substantial shareholdings in Texasgulf, 145 was a participant and
that the shares of the two companies should be attributed to the
group making the tender offer. The Texasgulf court, accepting the
Second Circuit's GAF guidelines as to when a group becomes obli-
gated to file a Schedule 13D, 146
 rejected plaintiff's proposition:
It takes more than the arithmetic of adding up shares
to determine that a statutory group exists and that a filing
143 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
144 Id. at 391. The opinion is a textbook in defense tactics for counsel for the issuer and
its management. See, e.g., id. at 380 n.2 (closing argument of counsel for Texasgulf, Inc.).
For other well-informed discussions of tender offer defense tactics, see generally Cary,
Corporate Devices Used to Insulate Management from Attack, 25 Bus. Law, 839 (1970);
O'Boyle, Changing Tactics in Tender Offers, 25 Bus. Law. 863 (1970); Schmults & Kelly,
Cash Take-Over BidsDefense Tactics, 23 Bus. Law. 115 (1967). Perhaps the best known
and best conducted defense against an exchange offer was that of B.F. Goodrich Company
against Northwest Industries in 1969. See J. Brooks, The Go-Go Years 176-77 (1973).
145 366 F. Supp. at 403-04.
1 " Id. at 403. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 718 (2d Cir. 1971).
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must be made. Two criteria must be met: (1) The members
must agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring,
holding, or disposing of securities; and (2) once the mem-
bers agree to act, they must own beneficially or acquire
beneficially in excess of 5% of a class of equity security.
Mere relationship, among persons or entities, whether fam-
ily, personal or business, is insufficient to create a group
which is deemed to be a statutory person. There must be
agreement to act in concert. 147
One further point can be gleaned from the Texasgulf opinion. It
was quite clear that CDC had a carefully planned purchase program
beginning in March 1973. As stated, the purchases were designed to
cease prior to the two companies reaching in the aggregate owner-
ship of the threshold percentage of shares. The court agreed that the
CDC decision not to make further purchases was merely a business
judgment based upon a desire to avoid the section 13(d) filing
requirement and to allow the price of the target company's stock to
settle in the market until July, when the decision whether to proceed
with the tender offer was to be made. Relying on the legislative
history of the 1970 amendment to the Williams Act,' 48
 the court
held that a conscious avoidance of the five percent triggering percen-
tage did not constitute a violation of law.'"
The Texasgulf decision adds one more category to the growing
decisional literature surrounding section 13(d). Defendants may now
protest that their dealings together did not rise to the level of acting
in concert but were merely the product of a relationship outside the
scope of section 13(d)(3). Whether such a relationship may be main-
tained even if there are no "prior substantial conditions" to agree-
ment or if some, but not all, of the members of the group possess the
requisite view to control, must await further judicial analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
To some extent, the problem of when a section 13(d)(3) group
forms remains unresolved. However, certain areas have stabilized in
the course of judicial and administrative interpretation of the
section's language. For example, counsel can no longer, in the face
of the decisions and rulings previously discussed, rely in good faith
on the Seventh Circuit's holding in Bath Industries 's° that section
147 366 F. Supp. at 403 (emphasis added).
1411 See notes 1-18 supra and accompanying text.
149 366 F. Supp, at 404.
' 5 ° Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
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13(d)(3) group formation can occur only when an intent to acquire
more shares is formulated.
Other areas are less susceptible to solution. It is apparent that
concerted action among the group membership is necessary, but it is
difficult to ascertain the level to which these concerted activities
must rise to impose the statutory requirements. Probably the SEC
staff's broad view's' as to what constitutes "acting in concert" goes
beyond what Congress intended. But it is difficult to state with any
degree of assurance that such a view will not be accepted by the
courts should the Commission decide to press the issue.
The importance of judicial and administrative precedents in the
area of section 13(d) group formation, as elsewhere, lies ultimately
in the lawyer's ability to draw guidance from them in formulating
advice for a client. More often than not, counsel will be approached
by a group which clearly contemplates an attempt to alter the
control pattern of the issuer. On these occasions he must urge an
immediate filing much the same as the attorney advised Francis
Rondeau in the Mosinee case. Usually management will by that
time be aware of the facts relevant to the intended takeover bid
and, therefore, as a tactical matter, disclosure will in large measure
be irrelevant. If, however, the pre-filing accumulation process de-
pends on counsel's advice, he must tread a narrower line. Counsel
does not serve his client's interest by engaging in an excess of
caution. Often disclosure at an early juncture in the accumulation
process may serve to terminate the plan, especially if money sup-
pliers become nervous at the prospect of publicity and a long and
bitter public relations battle. On the other hand, if counsel waits too
long his client may find himself enjoined not only from purchasing
more stock, but even from voting that which he already owns, at
least until the "effects" of the failure to file have worn off. It is a
difficult problem to resolve, and the consequences of an erroneous
decision may have substantial impact.
Fortunately the courts are creating a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty in this troublesome area. The analyses contained in such cases
as Nicholson and Texasgulf, while quite broad, should not hamper
insurgents to the extent feared as a result of the GAF decision. In
particular, the Nicholson decision provides support for those attor-
neys who would advise that mere discussions regarding the man-
agement of the issuer, taking place among persons who in the aggre-
gate own more than the threshold percentage, does not trigger the
filing requirement. The problem for the future lies in the need to
find flexible and workable remedies when the filing deadline has




 Where he is retained in time, however, counsel has ample
decisional guidance as to when a section 13(d)(3) group is born.
152
 Judge Pell provides exemplary articulation of this point in his dissent to the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Mosinee. His specific objection is to the gamesmanship he sees "becoming
the order of the day in the area of acquisition-for-control." 500 F.2d at 1022 (dissenting
opinion), citing Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.)
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